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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J.R. BAGNALL, aka, JOSEPH 
R. BAGNALL, and FLORENCE 
BAGNALL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an 
Idaho Corporation,...UNITED 
PAINT AND COLORS COMPANY, 
et al., 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 13753 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the Defendant-Respondent, United Paint & 
Colors Company, by and through its attorney, Richard L. Maxfield, and 
respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing of the above-entitled 
case as it applies to the Plaintiff-Appellants and the Defendant-
Respondent, United Paint & Colors Company. 
Said Defendant-Respondent alleges the Court erred in 
the following particulars: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE 
DEED MADE TO UTAH VALLEY LAND & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WHEN IN 
FACT SAID CORPORATION WAS INCORPORATED AS UTAH VALLEY LAND & DEVELOP-
MENT COMPANY. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The affidavit of Jean B. Nyberg Shirk, filed herein 
by the Plaintiffs, shows that on March 3, 1962, she executed a 
Warranty Deed conveying a one-half interest in 140.15 acres to 
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation. In said affidavit, 
she states that at the time of executing the Deed, "...it was my 
intent at the time I signed the Deed and handed it to Mr. Redmond, 
that I was conveying the property to Utah Valley Land and Development 
Corporation." 
Within 20 days after the Deed was signed, a corporation 
was formed in the name of Utah Valley Land and Development Company, 
and when the corporation was formed, the Deed was given to its officers 
by the promoter, who had possession of it. Mrs. Shirk was paid a 
i 
valuable consideration for the Warranty Deed, and recognized thereafter 
that she no longer held an equitable interest in said 140.15 acres. 
The Corporation, after being formed, took the legal title to said 
i 
property, and years later in conveying the title to said property, 
conveyed it out in the name of "Corporation", the same as received 
which most persons believe to be synonymous with "Company". 
The Courts have uniformly recognized that a deed is 
to be construed in favor of vesting title and that a slight difference 
in the spelling of a name is to be disregarded. 
Carlson v. Lindauer, 259 P2d 925 (1953)-Calif. 
A deed is to be construed in favor of vesting title... 
The deed should be construed to give effect to the 
intention of the grantor...It is not necessary that 
a grantee in a deed be mentioned by name. If the 
designation or description is sufficient to identify • 
the person or persons intended, the deed is effectual. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Woodward v. McCollum, 111 NW 623 (1907)-ND 
Language used in a~ieed of conveyance of real property, 
as well as other contracts, should be given a common-
sense interpretation, to the end that the evident 
meaning and intention of the parties may be given 
effect (at 625). 
City Bank of Portage v. Plank, 124 NW 1000 (1910)-
Wisc. (In ascertaining the grantee) the real intention 
of the parties is to be sought and effectuated by 
courts.. .that intent may be effectuated by ascertaining 
under proper rules of evidence the intention of the 
parties, although such person (the grantee) be not 
designated by his legal or usual name...If the court 
can find that a certain person was intended as grantee, 
it matters not what name is given him in the deed 
(at 1001). 
Hodgkiss v. Northern Petroleum Consol., 67 P2d 
811, (1937)-Mont. A deed is sufficient if the grantee 
can be identified by extrinsic evidence (at 814). 
York v. Stone, 34 P2d 911 (1934)-Wash. A deed, in 
order to pass title, must designate the grantee without 
uncertainty, but it is not necessary that the grantee 
be described by name, if otherwise identified or made 
susceptible of identification by extrinsic evidence 
(at 913). 
Byrd v. Patterson, 48 Se2d 45, 229, N.C. 156 (1948) 
While the correct name of the grantee affords a ready 
means of identification of the person intended, its 
use is not a prerequisite to the validity of the instru-
ment. If a living or legal person is intended as the 
grantee and is identifiable by the description used, 
the deed is valid, however he may be named in the deed 
(at 47). 
Stainsby v. Schallenkamp, 34 NW2d 832 (1948) S.D. 
If the deed in its entirety distinguishes the grantee 
from the rest of the world it is sufficient (at 832, 
quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds Sec. 24b). 
In dealing with grants to corporations, the Courts also 
have uniformly held that the misnomer of a corporation as a grantee in 
a deed is not sufficient to defeat the grant if the identity is manifest 
and the corporation accepted the deed as delivered. 
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Elbert v. Wilmington Turngemeinde, 107 A 215 
(1919)-Delaware. In regard to mistake in setting out 
the name in a deed, the rule is that if it can be 
ascertained from the deed who is intended, the deed 
is not vitiated by mistake. The misnomer of a corpora-
tion as grantee in a deed is not sufficient to defeat 
the grant if the identity is manifest and the corpora-
tion accepted the deed as delivered. In the absence 
of extrinsic circumstances, it is sufficient if the 
grantee in the deed is expressed in the substance of 
the name of the corporation (at 216-217). 
Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. , 
Limited, of London, 56 SE 654 (S'.C. 1907), To hold 
that the slight change in the name of the corporation 
should defeat the deed would be to refuse to regard the 
intention of the parties concerned for the sake of an 
attenuated technicality. 
Public Industrials Corporation v. Reading Hardware Co., 
29 F2d 975 (CCA 3rd) 1929. As a matter of law, the 
authorities clearly show that a deed or mortgage is 
valid although the corporate name as set forth is not 
correct...An immaterial misnomer, as the ommission of 
one word in the corporate name, will not render an 
instrument invalid, where there was a proper authority 
to execute it (at 976-last sentence is from Thompson on 
Corp,, but no cite given). 
The New York Court ruled directly on a case with almost 
the identical facts situation as that before the Court at this time. 
A deed was made to Falconer Realty Corporation prior to the corporation 
being formed. When the corporation was formed, the name was Falconer 
Realty Company, Inc. The Court held the deed to be valid and title 
to be in the name of the corporation as formed. 
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Falconer Realty Corporation, 
90 N.Y. 2d 345. It is conceded by the defendant, Buck, 
that Falconer Realty Company, Inc. was, in truth and 
in fact, intended to be the grantee named in the deed 
which conveyed the premises to Falconer Realty Corpora-
tion. Such error upon the part of the scrivener of the 
deed is readily understandable where, as here, Falconer 
Realty Corporation was not in existence at the time of 
such conveyance. Under these circumstances the title 
is in Falconer Fealty Company, Inc., the intended grantee 
(at 346). 
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See also 19 C.J.S., Section 1093 at page 645: 
If, in a conveyance to or for a corporation, it 
can be ascertained from the deed who is intended 
to take as grantee, the designation thereof will be 
sufficient. A misnomer of a corporation as grantee 
will not defeat the grant if the identity is estab-
lished, and, particularly, if the deed is accepted by 
the corporation...The courts will presume that the 
words used were intended to be a description of, 
rather than to express the accurate full name of, 
the grantee; and this is specially so in the absence 
of proof of the existence of a corporation having the 
identical name used to describe the grantee in the 
conveyance. 
-5-
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE WAS A QUESTION OF 
FACT TO BE DECIDED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIMED INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, UNITED 
PAINT AND COLOR COMPANY. 
On page 6 of the Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief (which 
has just come to the attention of the attorney for Defendant-Respon-
dent), Plaintiffs1 attorney admits that the Plaintiffs had knowledge 
of the claimed interest of the Defendant-Respondent, United Paint & 
Colors Company, when he states as follows: 
In any event, the modification agreement was 
prepared by Mr, Tibbs, who had relied upon the 
representations of Messrs. xMaxfield and Hughes 
that Maxfield had acquired the outstanding interest 
of Mrs. Nyberg, the outstanding interest of all 
the other parties to the 1952 contract;...(J. R. 
Bagnall - Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V. 
Tibbs - Direct and Cross). 
Further on page 18 of Plaintiff-Respondentfs Brief, 
Mr. Howard again recognizes that the Defendant-Respondent claimed 
to have acquired Jean NybergTs interest when he states: 
Contrary to the assertions of the appellants, 
the question of marketable title was never a 
point of issue since Maxfield represented to 
Mr. Tibbs and to the sellers that he had acquired 
all of the balance of the outstanding interest 
of the parties. (Tr. 3, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31) 
Relying on his own assertions, the modification 
agreement of July 15, 1962 was made. 
When we look at this testimony we see there is no 
question but what the Bagnalls both knew of the claim of United 
Paint and Colors Company to the 140.15 acres. On page 3 of book 3 
Df the transcript, at line 19 the testimony of Mr. Bagnall being 
-6-
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questioned by Mr. Howard on direct examination is as follows: 
Q. Prior to this litigation did you have any 
reason to believe that Mr. Maxfield hadn't acquired 
all of the outstanding interests? 
A. I had no reason to believe that he hadn't. 
I took his word on it. 
Further in book 3 of the transcript at page 29 line 14 
the question was asked by Mr. Howard of Mrs. Bagnall on direct examin-
ation: 
Q. When was it that you met Mr. Maxfield in Mr. 
Tibbs' office? 
A. Near July 16, 1962. 
Then continuing on that page, line 28: 
Q. Well, will you relate to the Jury, to the Court 
the circumstances and conversations that took place on 
that meeting date? 
A. Well, we were surprised to see Mr. Maxfield and 
his attorney and his father. And he told us that they 
had possession of the ranch. 
MR. LORD: Your Honor, I!d ask that she 
specify who's talking rather than just !TtheyT!. 
A. Mr. Maxfield said he had possession of the ranch, 
he had moved his family on it, and he owned all of the 
outstanding interests in it, and that we — we could 
accept him there as a buyer or else. 
Then on line 29, page 30 the Plaintiff, Mrs. Bagnall, 
was asked: 
Q. Was anything said about where he was living at 
the time? 
A. He was living on the ranch. 
Q. What did he say about it? 
A. Well, he said he had possession and that he owned 
all the interests from other parties and that he was 
going to stay there. 
Q. Was anything said about the nature of your interests? 
Did he describe it for you? 
A. No. Mr.. Tibbs, I think, did that for us. 
-7-
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Then on the cross examination of Mr. Bagnall, book 2, 
page 23, line 10, the question was asked: 
Q. Did you make any statement concerning the one-
half interest in the hundred and 40 acres which Jean 
Nyberg owned? 
A. I think that we did, but, on the other hand, 
we were not allowed to discuss that. Mr. Maxfield, 
when he came in, I asked him if he said --
Q. Well, my question was --
MR. HOWARD: Let him answer. 
A. He said, MI own all of this — I've gathered 
up all of these interests,M 
Then again on the cross examination of Mr. Bagnall, 
book 2, at page 24, line 11, by Mr. Lord: 
Q. How did you purport in your understanding — I'm 
not asking you the legal implications, but from your 
understanding of the title, how could you feel you 
could transfer a warranty deed, sign a warranty deed 
conveying marketable title to that hundred and 40 
acre tract when you only had a half interest in it? 
A. If the titles were merging, it would be entirely 
possible --
Then on the same page at line 22, he continued: 
A. Not only that, but it would be a sensible approach 
to it. Mr. Maxfield had represented to me that he had 
all of the outstanding titles, I had bought all of them, 
and I own them, I have deeds for them. If he had that, 
why should I have to transfer the hundred and 40 point 
15, which have I too had been deeded to my sister, 
Jean, in 1952, and the other half interest to myself. 
For the Bagnalls to testify in Court that Mr. Maxfield 
had told them in 1962 that he'd picked up all the outstanding interests 
in the property, and Mr. Bagnall to testify that he only had a one-half 
interest in the property and that he felt that Mr. Maxfield's one-half 
interest in the property which had been acquired from Jean Nyberg 
-8-
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would merge with his, is completely contrary to the Affidavit which 
the Plaintiffs now ask the Court to accept. The Plaintiffs, in order 
to win their main case on marketable title, testified that Mr. Maxfield 
told them in 1962 that he had acquired Jean NybergTs interest. Later 
in order to win their case on the 140.15 acres they made an affidavit 
that in 1971 (9 years later) they were not aware nor did they have 
notice that Jean Nyberg had conveyed or attempted to convey her 
interest in said property. Their affidavit is completely contrary 
to their testimony at the trial and that given in the deposition of 
Mr. Bagnall prior to the pre-trial. 
In considering the affidavit of the Bagnalls, and 
whether or not they had knowledge of the claimed interests of the 
Defendant-Respondent, Judge Harding was appraised of the fact that 
Mr. Maxfield was in possession of the property, that he had been in 
possession since 1962, that he claimed to hold possession under color 
of title, and that he claimed to have acquired all of the other out-
standing interests in the property other than the Bagnalls. Possession 
has always been recognized as notice. 
Further, when Judge Harding granted the Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment he was familiar with the deposition of 
Mr. Bagnall which had been given in April of 1972, In the deposition 
at page 72, lines 16-19, he testified that he had been told that his 
sister, Jean Nyberg Shirk, had sold her one-half interest in the 
140,15 acres. Judge Harding had read this deposition, and had spent 
more than 40 hours in pre-trial where many of these matters were 
brought to the attention of the Court although they were not reported 
and made a part of the transcript. At the pre-trial where the Defen-
dants Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, both of the Plaintiffs 
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were present. When the question arose as to what If any consideration 
the Bagnalls had given Jean Nyberg Shirk for the Quitclaim Deed to 
some 25 parcels of property, Judge Harding remarked, "Well, they're 
here, letfs ask them." And so the Bagnalls were asked at that time 
what, if any, consideration they had paid Mrs. Jean Nyberg Shirk for 
the property. Mr. Bagnall replied, after some hesitation, that he 
had forgiven Jean of her obligations under the contract. It was 
recognized that she had no obligations under the contract, so in fact, 
she received no consideration at all for the Quitclaim Deed. 
It is here suggested that Judge Harding, at the pre-trial, 
recognized a fact of human nature, although it was not so expressed: 
The Bagnalls, realizing that Jean Nyberg Shirk had good title to one-
half of the 140.15 acres of ground which was worth several thousands 
of dollars, would not have requested her to deed the property to 
them for what in effect amounted to nothing as consideration, had 
they not known that she had previously deeded out her interest in the 
property and really had nothing of value to convey to them. Further, 
llrs. Shirk would not have deeded the property to the Bagnalls without 
receiving a substantial sum of money, except for the fact that she had 
sold her interest in the 140.15 acres to Utah Valley Land and Develop-
lent Corporation, had given a Warranty Deed to the property, and 
;herefore felt she had no further interest in the property. 
Furthermore, the Bagnalls were educated, professional 
eople, familiar with real estate transactions. Particularly Mrs. 
agnail, who testified on cross examination at the trial that she had 
orked for ten years in California as a licensed real estate agent. 
Book 2, page 156, lines 20-22). She further testified that she wrote 
ontracts, established escrows, showed properties, and had knowledge 
-10-
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of the necessity of conveying good title and evidence of ownership. 
(Book 2, page 157, lines 3-19). 
On May 8, 1974, after the plaintiffs! case had been tried 
and Judge Harding had heard all of the evidence, the plaintiffs filed 
a motion to vacate the Summary Judgment awarded in favor of the 
defendant, United Paint & Color Company. 
Said Motion came on regularly for hearing before Judge 
Harding on June 25, 1974 at Provo, Utah. The question of notice, 
possession and other matters were duly argued before the Court 
by plaintiffs1 attorneys, Jackson B. Howard and Ronald Brent Boutwell. 
Judge Harding being very familiar with all of the evidence introduced 
at the trial, all of the motions and other pleadings filed before 
and after the trial, and all of the pre-trials that had been held, care-
fully reviewed the Summary Judgment granted defendant, United Paint 
and Color Company, and then denied plaintiffs1 Motion and ordered 
the Summary Judgment to stand. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred 
in remanding the case between the Plaintiffs and United Paint & Colors 
Company for a new trial. 
From the cases cited, and the facts of this case, 
there should be no question but what the Warranty Deed from Jean 
Nyberg Shirk to Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation was a 
valid conveyance for a valuable consideration, and that the legal and 
equitable interest to one-half of the 140.15 acres was held by the 
Defendant-Respondent, United Paint & Colors Company. 
Further, the evidence before the Court, the Plaintiffs' 
own brief, testimony, and other facts before the Court, clearly show 
that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the Defendant-Respondent, United 
Paint & Color Company's interest in said property. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant-Respondent, respectfully 
requests a rehearing before the Court, and upon said rehearing, the 
Trial Court's Order granting Summary Judgment be affirmed. 
Resp^ttfujly requested, 
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS & DALEBOUT 
28 North 100 East, P. 0. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for United Paint & Colors 
Company, Defendant-Respondent 
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